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1. The US is the most important !!~~iD9_Q~!1D~! of the Community: its 
share in extra-EC Community imports has shown considerable stability, 
around a value of approximately 16~ (1978: 15,9%; 1983: 16,2~>, whereas 
the importance of the US market for EC exports has risen in the 1978-1983 
period from 13,7% to 16,6%. 
The Community, on the other hand, was the most important market for US 
exports <22% in 1983), whereas it follows Canada who is the principal suppliertothe 
US <Canada 20~; EC 17% in 1983). 
2. The !!2~~-2~1~D£~ between the EC and the US has been characterized by 
continuous EC trade deficits from 1958 until 1983: the trend led to a 
maximum deficit of -17,826 mioECU in 1980, and was followed by a certain 
improvement, leading to a reversal of the situation in 1984 <balance for 
9 months: EC surplus of 4,050 mioECU). As compared with the same period 
in 1983, EC imports from the US increased by 15% in 1984 <9 months>, 
whereas EC exports increased by 41~ <in value terms). 
the most striking features in the 
last years have been an increase in Q!QQQ!1iQD_Qf_iD~Y~1!i21_9QQ~~ (SITC 
classes 5~8)in EC imports from the US (1980: 60,6% - 1983: 62,8~), as 
compared to a decrease in the proportion of the same goods (1980: 79,2~ -
1983: 74,2%) in EC exports to the US. 
As concerns 22~i£_9QQ~~ (SITC classes 0, 1, 2, 4) except oil, the share 
in EC exports has risen from 8,3% in 1980 to 11,1% in 1983 whereas the 
share in EC imports has fallen from 24,5% to 22,5% over the same period. 
The composition of the EC/US trade has shown therefore a certain stability 
over recent years. 
EC/US trade has a greater importance for the EC economy than for the 
US economy. Global EC/US trade in 1983 accounted for 4% of GNP in the 
Community, and 2,7% in the US (1979: 3,1% and 3,2%>. This indicator has 
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to be appreciated against a global stronger dependance of the EC on its 
exports <exports/GOP = 12,2% in 1983) than is the case for the US 
<1983: 7,7X>. 
The EC is currently ~unnin~ high, but dec~easin~ deficits in primary secto~s 
<1980: -1~.83 Bio USD; 1983: -~.20Bio USD) and has reversed its negative 
position as concerns manufactured products (1980: -7.52 Bio USD; 1983: 
+2.42 Bio USD). 
in 1983 concerned mainly road vehicles, 
mineral fuels, iron and steel products; Q~9~!iY~-~~1~D£~§ were concentrated 
in food products, crude materials<except fuel~, office equipments and 
telecommunications, machinery and transport equipment <except road 
vehicles>. 
US/EC trade is organized, in theory, on the basis of the GATT 
agreements, i.e. on the basis of the most-favoured nation principle. 
Special agreements have been undertaken as concerns fi§biD9 (1977>, 
o~£1~~r_§~QQ!i~§ to the EC (1958) and cooperation for peaceful use of 
o~£1~~r_QQ~~r <1959>. 
5~_§!~~1-~~QQt!§ are organized by means of the 1982 agreement on 
carbon steel (expiring December 1985) and the 1985 agreement on s~_QiQ~ 
~QQ_!~~~-~~QQt!§· 
Most of the US/EC trade falls therefore QD!~-~o9~r-2a!I_r~1~§, and 
any kind of measure affecting it has to be appreciated in the light of 
the general agreement and the codes adopted in its system. 
Since 1958, US/EC trade has been influenced by the three rounds of 
multilateral negotiations in GATT- the Dillon Round (1960/61>, the 
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Kennedy Round (1964/67), and the Tokyo Round <1973/79). 
Results achieved have been considerable in the industrial sector 
(especially as concerns cutting of tariff rates) whereas trade in 
agricultural products has OQ! been regulated in such a way as to avoid 
recurrent problems and disputes on matters of the utmost importance. 
In the 70's,furthermore, the gradual spreading of non-tariff barriers 
to trade, and the drift towards market sharing on bilateral basis (i.e. 
"voluntary restraint" and "orderly marketing" agreements) has adversely affected 
the results of previous liberalization in the industrial sector, expressing 
in many ways a protectionist answer to economic crisis. 
The economic crises of the 70's, as well as changing international 
patterns of productivity and comparative advantages, have led, both in the 
US and in the EC, to heavier public subsidization of ailing industries 
and protectionist measures taken in order to supply relief from foreign 
competition (perceived as "unfair"). 
8. Q~f~O£~-~lH~!!!~ in US and the EC against "unfair trade". 
The principle of "unfair trade", in GATT terms, is currently used in 
order to define exports which do not comply with articles VI and XVI of 
the General Agreement, as interpreted in the 1979 anti-dumping and anti-
subventions codes. In fact, whereas measures like the imposition of tariff 
duties and quotas are by essence public, and can be immediately met by 
demand for compensation, the existence and effects of dumping and 
subsidization are frequently difficult to establish. 
Both the US and the EC have adopted over the years legal systems, 
based on the GATT system, in order to define the procedures for establishing 
the existence or the threat of "material injury to a domestic industry", or 
"material retardation of the establishment of such an industry" caused 
by dumping or subsidies, and the fixation of anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties. 
It must be noticed, however, that §~!!_£Q~ifi£s!iQD_i~_fs!_f!Q!!!_£1~s!, 
especially as concerns the case for so-called "domestic subsidies" 
<export subsidies on the other hand, are clearly defined in the code and 
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banned for all products except primary products). 
The following table <based on Commission data) establishes a 
certain parallelism between US, EC and GATT measures as concerns trade 
law remedies against "unfair" imports. 
Section 201 of the 1974 
Trade Act (Escape clause) 
Section 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act <Unfair Trading 
Practices) 
Art. XIX 
Art. XXIII 
<only under the 
Agreement) 
Regulation 288/82 <Title V) 
Regulation 2641/84 
Section 701 of the 1930 Art. YI + XVI + l Regulation 2176/84 
Tariff Act (Countervailing Code Reg~lation 2177/84 
duties> 
Section 731 of the 1930 
Tariff Act <Anti-dumping 
duties) 
Section 232 of the 1962 
Trade Expansion Act (Safe-
guarding national security) 
Section 22 of the 1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act 
Art. VI + Code 
Art. XXI Article 2230) (b) of Treaty 
No comparable equivalent under 
EC law except in the case of 
agricultural products where a 
variable levy may be regarded 
as fulfilling a similar purpose. 
Both the US 1974 Trade Act and the 1930 Tariff Act have been 
considerably amended, lastly by the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act. 
It is difficult to make a comparison between the effectiveness of the 
EC and the US legal system for ensuring a "fair trade": some information 
might be gathered on the actual number and distribution over the last years 
of cases initiated and concluded. A detailed analysis of the consistency 
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of both systems with GATT principles falls clearly out of the scope of 
the present study: I will however indicate, in dealing with the various 
sectors concerned, some cases in which these m~asur~s h~v~ ~~~n ~rtiv~t~o. 
The problem of steel exports from the Community can be considered as a 
good example of the way US "unfair trade" legislation has been used in 
order· to obtain a "self restraint" agreement from a trading partner. 
The petitions for relief filed by US enterprises in early 1982 
(sections 701, 731 and 301) against Community exports of steel products 
were subject to a precise procedural time-table, leading automatically 
to decision, and the Community sought to conclude an agreement on limiting 
the export of certain products, prior to the decision on the cases, and 
on condition that the petitions be withdrawn. 
The agreement was concluded on 21 October 1982 for the period until 
the end of 1985: it provides for limits on Community exports for 10 
categories of products, in terms of US market share, ranging from 2,20% 
to 21,85%. (Overall penetration was estimated at 5,6% approximately). 
A system of licenses was created by the Community in order to monitor 
exports and allocate quotas between Member States. 
The objective of the agreement is "to give time to permit restructuring" 
in the industries both of the US and the Community: it is concluded for 
the period until end of 1985 a~ in theory, at least by that time ~!!_gyg!i£ 
~ig_!Q_~QffiffiYOi!l-~!~~1-iD9Y~!ri~~-§bQY!9_~og, in conformity with ECSC State 
aids Code. 
10. The Community's effort in restructuring its steel industries can 
hardly be disputed: ECSC decision on 29 June 1983 provided for reductions 
in capacities of at least 26.7 million tons, <out of 169 million 
in 1980>. 
Reductions in capacities on the American side have been, in the 1981-
1984 period, approximately 21 million tons (1), leading to an estimated 
(1) United States Mission to the Community: USA text 94 - 26 December 1984 
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capacity of 131 million tons. The basic problem with the agreement, 
however is that itdoesnot QQ!ig~ each side to promote the restructuring 
of its industry, nor does it fix time-tables in that direction. 
It is possible therefore to conclude that "the Arrangement is simply 
another successor to the voluntary restraint agreements and to the US 
Trigger price mechanism" and the problem dealt with "is again that of 
foreign imports and not that of competitivity and structure of the 
home industry" (1). 
Furthermore, the agreement leaves many problems open as concerns 
the interpretation of the GATT subsidies code, and constitutes "another 
step in the organisation of world trade" (2), and towards international 
market-sharing practices. 
The US, notably, has decided to control the total volume of steel 
imports from almost all sources until 1989. Self-restraint agreements 
were recently reached with Japan, Brasil, South Korea and Spain: the US 
is aiming to reduce overall steel product imports to 20.5% (1984: 24%). 
The ECSC, on its side, maintains a system of basic prices for 
imports, calculated so as to avoid dumping on its markets, and of 
restraint agreements with 14 third countries. As a result, total imports 
have risen only from 9.17%(1979) to 9.86%(1982) of the Community's market. 
The Commission hashowever received a mandate from tne Council tor negotia! 
ing a certain relaxation of ECSC import quotas in existing restraint agreements. 
The 1982 Agreement u1~ not extend to special steels, for which the 
US ~resident, under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposed on 
5 July 1983 tariff and import quotas. 
This action was based, on international level, on GATT article XIX 
(Emergency action on Imports of particular products), and was therefore 
(1) Bourgeois and Bunyan - The European Community I United States steel 
Arrangement 1984 - Common Market Law Review 21 - 1984 
(2) Ibidem 
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subject to compensation to the Community: since no agreement could be 
reached on compensation, the Community decided unilaterally, on 1 March 1984, 
to put quotas on certain US exports to the EC (mainly skis and chemical 
products>. 
A separate exchange of letters, annexed to the 1982 agreement, 
provided that both the Community and the US could ask for consultations 
if ECSC deliveries to the US market went over their average share in 
the 1978-1981 period <5,9%>. The Community has considered however, that 
several exceptions apply to the calculation of the "US apparent 
consumption", such as the "short supply" clause, contained in article 8 
of the 1982 agreement. 
According to the US, these exceptions, if implemented, would raise 
the Community's share up to 14%. 
Following a ~nilateral block of imports by the US in November 1984, 
the Community and the US concluded an agreement on 9 January 1985, valid 
until 31 December 1986, limiting ECSC exports to 7.6% + "short supply". 
Immediate disagreement broke out, however, on the interpretation of 
the "short supply" clause, which has led to new consultations and new 
problems in the case of exports of "oil country tubular goods". 
For a series of 17 steel products, including semi-finished products, 
the 1982 agreement provides for consultations, in case that trade in 
these products "impair or threaten to impair the attainment of the 
objectives of the Arrangement". 
The US maintain that a trade diversion has occured from imports 
subject to the arrangement towards imports of these "consultation 
products". 
The Community on the other hand points out that the overall 
penetration of ECSC exports to the US has not increased above its 1981 
level (1981: 5.35%; 1982: 6.25%; 1983: 4.67%; 1984: 4.93% for 10 months). 
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Consultations have therefore taken place, without any results to 
this moment. 
US/EC trade relations in steel products are a good example of the 
difficulties caused by market-sharing agreements: not only do they tend 
to perpetuate themselves <the 1982 agreement will have probably to be 
renewed), but there is no guarantee that the "temporary" relief given 
to ailing industries will be used for restructuring and becoming competitive. 
On the other hand, the interpretation and implementation of the 
agreements offers almost infinite possibilities for misunderstandings 
and disputes. 
The Community's protests against the US protectionist attitude are 
naturally undermined by the fact that public subsidization of its 
industries has been quite strong, and !b~-§~!!_£Qg~_QQ_§y~§i9i~§_gQ~§ 
OQ!_Q£2~ig~_fQ£_2_§yffi£i~o!1~_£1~2r_1~921-~2§~_fQr_rY1iog_Qy!_Yoi12!~r21 
£~2£!iQD_!Q-~liQQ£!§_Qf_§y~§igi~~g_gQQg§, provided that "material injury" 
has been proven. 
It can be pointed out however that ECSC not only operated considerable 
reductions in capacity during the years in question, but has also set a 
time-table for phasing out subsidies by the end of 1985. 
On the ~§_§ig~, no clear committment towards reducing capacity has 
been undertaken. The 1984 Trade and Tariff Act in particular recommends 
in fact a market-sharing approach, so that the steel imports will be 
maintained in the 17.0 to 20.2% range: authority is however provided to 
the President in order to enforce bilateral restraint agreements "subject 
to the condition that the steel industry undertake comprehensive 
modernization". 
The act also recognizes that ''import relief will. be ineffective and 
will not serve the national economic interest" unless the industry 
"engages in serious efforts substantially to modernize and to improve 
its international competitiveness". 
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!b~-~Qffiffi~OiS~ is the biggest importer in the world of agricultural 
products, and the most important market for US exports. Over the years, 
however, the EC has also become a very important exporter on world 
markets, accounting for approximately 10r. of world exports. 
(USD billion) 
Value of world,EC and US exports for agricultural products 
-----------------,----------,--------,---------,---------,----------------
12Z§ 
World 98.6 171.7 
EC 9.7 17.6 
12§Q 
245,8 
28,1 
12§~ 
224,7 
25,1 
222,6 
23,8 
us 33.0 46.4 41.7 40.9 
I I -----------------,----------~--------~---------~---------~----------------
EC share in r. I 9.8 I 10.3 I 11.4 I 11.2 I 10.7 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
US share in r. 1 1 19 2 1 18 9 1 18 6 1 I I • I • I • I 18.4 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
-----------------l----------1--------l---------l---------l----------------
Excluding intra-EC trade 
Source: - EC Commission 1984 Report on Agriculture 
- COMTRADE 
The Community has attained self-sufficiency in a number of sectors, 
including cereals, sugar, vegetables, dairy products, meat. 
EC agriculture exports have been more dynamic, over the 1973-1983 
period, than world exports generally; on 1973 basis, the evolution has 
been: 
12n 12Z§ 12§Q 12§~ 12§~ 
World exports 100 174.1 249.3 227.9 225.3 
EC exports 100 181.4 289.7 258.8 245.4 
Source: - EC Commission 1984 Report on Agriculture 
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!h~-~§_i§ traditionally a net exporter of agricultural products: the 
evolution in 82/83 has been the following: 
1982 
1983 
41.7 
40.9 
16~ ~[~§~!J!_§!£Y£!Y£~_Qf_§f!~§_!£!~~ 
23,7 
26,0 
(USD billion) 
~!!!!:!£~ 
+28,0 
+14,9 
The following table reflects trade in agricultural products subject to 
EC regulations for the period January-June 1984: 
Pork 
Beef 
Sheep and goat meat 
Poultry 
Fish 
Cereals 
Rice 
Dairy produce 
Eggs 
Fresh fruit, vegetable 
Processed fruit, vegetable 
Hops 
Flowers 
Oils and fats 
Grains and seed 
Sugar 
Wine 
Tobacco 
Flax 
Hemps 
Dry forage 
Rest annexe II 
Other processed products 
Rest Chapt. 01-24 
Agr.prod.chapt. 25-99 
Total agricult. prod. 
5,589 
6,200 
1 
93 
89,077 
9,735 
253 
99,783 
2,472 
16,764 
56,219 
14,861 
50,469 
27,710 
7,758 
13,928 
334,180 
51,352 
3,218 
84,370 
185,345 
782,282 
64,963 
1,906,622 
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<1,000 ECU) 
§f_!me2r!§_!r2m-~§ 
13,654 
69,468 
867 
6,906 
84,722 
450,525 
77,667 
1,138 
2,403 
133,926 
68,610 
5,639 
15,355 
2,464,076 
61,310 
25,605 
4,073 
335,861 
45 
4,339 
703,058 
30,401 
84,124 
751,828 
5,395,600 
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It can be noticed that overall EC deficit <total agriculture production) 
for 6 months is running at approximately 3,486 million ECU. The most 
important negative headings are cereals <-44Q.7 million) and oi~and 
fats <-2,436.3 million>; the most important positive heading is wine 
(+ 330 million). 
The EC deficits in the previous years have been: 
1981: -5,590 1982: -6,402 1983: -5,605 (million ECU). 
Although final figures for 1984 are not yet available, the trend 
shows therefore an increase inthe EC deficit. 
The setting up of the CAP, with its system of variable import levies 
and export refunds, was in fact only possible as a result of previous 
measures taken by the USA. 
In 1955 the US obtained a formal ~2i~~r from GATT provisions in order 
to "continue to use import quotas and fees to the extent necessary to 
prevent material interference with its domestic agricultural support 
programmes, so legitimizing the primacy of such programmes over internat-
ional trade obligations". <1>. 
Since GATT provisions allow export subsidies to be used for primary 
products (article XVI), subject to the condition that they do not allow 
a country "more than an equitable share of world trade", the EC was able 
to set up in the 60's its external trade mechanisms for the CAP. 
The discussions in the Dillon Round and in the Kennedy Round were 
however centered on the unwillingness of the US to accep~without 
adequate compensation, losses caused to its exports by the setting up 
of CAP: in the Dillon Round the US obtained an important 
concessi on, i .• e. the _b_i_n_d_i_n_g __ o_f __ E_c__d_u_ty _ _r_a_t_e_s __ C!_t__':_o_~_o_r __ z_e_r_o __ ':_e_v_e_':_~_f_o_r 
-~~~i~cJ-k2ro_g!~!~o~2i12~~g§_~og_gi!2~~g_e£Qg~£!2· 
The CAP was subject to heavy attack also in the Tokyo Round, while the 
main exporters tried to bring international trade in agriculture under the 
<1> Harris, Swindbank, Wilkinson- The Food and Farm policies of the 
European Community, 1984, p. 275. 
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same discipline as industrial trade: the Commission, however, had 
received a negotiating mandate which stated that ''the CAP's principles 
and mechanisms shall not be called into question and therefore do not 
constitute a matter for negotiation" (1). 
The EC continued therefore to support an approach based on the 
International commodity agreements, as a means of stabilizing and raising 
---------------------------------
world prices, and reducing the cost of the CAP's export subsidies. 
The results of the Tokyo Round were therefore very limited as concerns 
agricultural products. The feeling in the Community was, however, that 
by its concessions in industrial liberalization, it had obtained v 
recognition of the CAP by its trading partners. 
The disputes have been continuous, starting with the interpretation 
of the EC/US "standstill agreements" which sought to freeze the position 
as at 1 September 1960 for trade in a number of products (e.g. the so 
called "chicken war" concerning US exports to Germany). 
In particular, in the 70's, the US applied frequently countervailin9. 
duties on EC exports; the Community maintained that the US did not abide 
by GATT rules, insofar that they did not prove "material injury" to its 
producers before doing so. 
On the other hand, the Community took several non-duty measures which 
were heavily criticised by its trading partners <i.e. 1974-1977 three year beef 
import ban; 1976 scheme for soya imports). 
In the meantime, competition of EC and US exports on the !hir9_m2!~~!§ 
developed itself also considerably, as the EC obtained and went over self-
sufficiency level in the cereal sector and relied more heavily on exports 
for the disposition of surpluses in the dairy sector. 
The EC/ACP and the EC/Mediterranean countries ~!~f~!~O!i21_!!29~ 
29!~~m~O!§ were also criticised by the US insofar that they 
constituted exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination (embodied 
(1) Almost exactly the same expression has been used by the Council in its 
March 1985 declaration on a future GATT negotiating round. 
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in the most favoured nation treatment) which is the base of multilateral free 
trade in the GATT system; article XXIV, regulating the establishment of 
Customs unions and Free-trade areas is interpreted in diverging manner by the 
US and the EC. 
19. The EC has tried in the last few years to obtain a stabilization of 
imports from the US as concerns certain products used for animal food, such 
as corn gluten feed and maize pellets; the zero rates applied by the EC for 
these products however (see point no. 17) formed part of the results of the 
negotiations in GATT which accompanied the setting up of the CAP: on that 
occasion, the Community obtained the possibility of setting up duties in 
the cereal, dairy and meat sector, in exchange of concessions on products 
like soybeans and corn gluten. 
Any limit imposed to US exports should therefore ~~-D~9Q!i2!~Q_!~[Q~9~ 
GATT <article XVIII) and would be subject to compensations offered to US: 
unilateral limits would expose the Community to retaliation by the US. 
The US has not shown any interest in coming to an agreement on this 
subject with the EC; as a matter of fact, it seems that the Community 
itself does not aim any more to obtain stabilization at the proposed 
level since, from the first data available, it seems that US exports in 
1984 have been running at a sensibly lower level than in 1983. 
The imposition by the EC of a !2~_QQ_Y~9~!2Qi~_Qii2_2QQ_f2!2 seems 
also to have been abandoned for much the same reasons. 
Cereals 
Oils and fats 
US exports to EC <million ECU) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
(9 months) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
(9 months) 
Qy~£211 
210 
1,410 
1,088 
757 
3,903 
4,329 
4,174 
2,825 
- 13 bis -
17.6 
117.5 
90.7 
84.1 
325 
361 
348 
313 
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The ~~-fQ~9r~~~ has adopted in the 1984 trade and tariff act, a 
"sense of Congress" that the President should oppose the measures discussed 
above: "if unilateral action is taken by the EC to restrict or inhibit 
the importation of either non grain feed ingredients, including corn 
gluten feed, or vegetable fats and oils, including soybean products, 
the US should act immediately to restrict EC imports of at least the 
aggregate value of the reduced and potentially reduced US export 
products". 
The US retaliation would probably harm EC exports in the industrial 
sector, as well as the one agricultural product in which the EC seems 
to be highly competitive on the US market, namely ~i~~ <EC exports 
1981: 509 mio ECU; 1982: 617 million; 1983: 736 million; 1984: (9 months) 
526 million). 
The US trade and tariff act 1984 already paves some ground 
for protectionist measures, by stating that "there is a substantial 
imbalance in international wine trade" as concerns access to US 
market and access to foreign markets, and by asking the President to 
report within 12 months on the results obtained through consultations 
with each major wine trading country. 
The act also expands the definition of the wine sector so as to 
include grape producers, who are now also enabled to file requests 
for import relief against foreign wine producers. 
The EC maintains that the GATT system is based on overall and 
multilateral reciprocity, so that any requestfor r~£ier2£ill_i~-Q~~ 
~~~j2!_2~1 could impair the whole system: it also maintains that the GATT 
definition of industry does not allow the US interpretation. 
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Need for achieving greater liberalization in the trade in agricultural 
products was recognized in GATT, which set up the Committee on trade in 
Agriculture <November 1982) in order to "examine trade measures affecting 
m2r~~1-2££~~~ and supplies (including m~2~Y£~~-m2iD12iD~~-YD~~r-~~£~~1i2D~ 
or derogations) and the operation of the General agreement as regards 
~YQ~i~i~~-2ff~£1iD9-29£i£Y11Y£~, including export subsidies and other 
forms of assistance". 
This formula points out the three major problems in this sector, 
which bear heavily on US/EC trade relations: 
1) Ib~-~2i~~r accorded to the US in March 1955 as concerns obligations 
under articles II ("schedules of concessions") and XI ("general 
elimination of quantitative restrictions") of GATT, to the extent 
necessary to prevent conflicts with Section 22 of the US Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. This section requires the administration to impose 
quantitative restrictions and special duties on imports likely to 
damage US farm programmes. 
2> The system of ~2£i221~-1~~i~~ on access to the EC markets operated 
by the CAP. 
3) The b~2~~-~Y2~i~i!21i2D supplied by several Contracting Parties 
(including the US and the EC) to the agricultural sectors,which comprises 
both domestic subsidies and export subsidies. 
The recommendations adopted on 15 November 1984 by the Committee 
on trade in agriculture refer to all these problems (1), and stress 
the importance of strengthening GATT discipline on these aspects of 
trade. As concerns ~~~Qt!-~YQ~i~i~~ however, the EC and the US position 
(1) GATT L/5732, 16 November 1984 
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could not be reconciled, so that the committee decided that "the following 
approaches should be elaborated in paralle-l": 
- improvements in the existing framework of rules and disciplines (the 
"EC approach"); 
- a general prohibition, subject to carefully defined exceptions, in 
conjuncQon with improvements in the existing rules and disciplines 
and their application ("US approach"). 
The 1983 GATT report (1) reflects the views of several members of the 
ad-hoc GATT working party that "the US had made no serious efforts to 
eliminate the underlying causes of surplus production". 
For this reason there was not sufficient justification for the US 
"not replacing Section 22 controls with measures consistent with GATT". 
Several members, including the EC, insisted that they "would oppose 
to deflect discussions of the waiver solely to the Committee on Trade 
in Agriculture". 
It is my opinion that iD_!Q~_!Qr!b£Qmiog_§~!!_D~9Q!i2!iQO_£QYDQ£_!b~ 
~§-~2i~~r-~bQyig_fQrm_2_£~D!r~i-~QiO!_Qf_gi~£Y~~iQD in the agricultural sector. 
However, it must be apparent, in this context, that the Council's declaration 
of March 1985 would be difficult to sustain. 
It is extremely difficult to evaluate total subsidization to 
agriculture in the US and in the EC, considering the variety of instruments 
adopted, and any comparison would depend on~the dollar/ECU 
exchange rate adopted. 
A rough estimate of EC domestic and export subsidies to its agriculture 
can be supplied by the budgetary costs of intervention and export 
refunds: 
<1> GATT activities in 1983 - Geneva, June 1984. 
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fsQ§~-§~~£~D!~~-E~Q~O~i!~r~l-E~QQ£!_8~f~D~~-~o~_!o!~r~~D!i20£_12ZZ:§~ 
<ECU mn) 
12ZZ 12Z§ 12l2 12§Q 12§1 
Intervention 4,001.1 4,923.1 5,458.9 5,620.2 5,932.6 7,352 10,360 11,683 
Export 
refunds 2,830.3 3,749.6 4,981.8 5,695.0 5,208.6 5,054 5,560 6,718 
Total 6,830.4 8,672.7 10,440.7 11,315.2 11,141.2 12,406 15,920 18,401 
Intervention 
as % of total 58.6 56.8 52.3 49.7 53.2 59.3 65.1 63.5 
<a> 1984 supplementary and amending budget. 
Source: Commission - annual agriculture reports. 
An analysis of US subsidies should bear in mind thatdirect and indirect formsof 
subsidization are highly developed, and include a mix of Loan programmes, 
intervention, set-aside and payment-in-kind measures: 
(US million) 
12l2 12§Q 12§1 12§~ 12§~ 
3,610 2,750 4,040 11,650 18,850 7,310 
Source: Financial Times, 31 January 1985 
In absolute size and at exchange rates prevailing in the years considered, the 
amount of subsidies was therefore higher in the US in 1983, and in the EC in 1984. 
Further information will have to be gathered on this subject. 
The 1985 Farm bill, now before Congress, proposes dropping price supports 
and subsidies, ending acreage reduction schemes, and Limiting government 
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subventions to individual farmers. 
According to Secretary of Agriculture John Block <1>, expenses over 
the next five years, under existing US farm programs, would cost 60,000 
to 85,000 million USD with the current Law, and would be cut to 20,000 -
35,000 million by the new program. Yearly expenses would therefore drop 
f~om the 12,000/17,000 million range to a 4,000/7,000 million range: in 
ECU terms (assuming a rate at 1.40) this would mean 5,600/9,800 MioECU by 
year. 
The expected effect of the Farm bill would be to depress US and world 
prices, especially in the grain sector, to strengthen US exports and to 
cause heavy increases in export restitutions by the EC. 
The Community has set up a "steering committee" on perspectives of CAP, 
which has organized itself in working groups, one of them centered on 
external trade in agricultural products. The following time-table will 
apply to report from the working grou~and the committee: 
- mid-June: 
mid-October: 
- November: 
Commission document, pointing out the different options 
available; 
discussion in the EP; 
Commission memorandum to the Council. 
President Delors has stressed,in addressing the EP on 17 April 1985, 
that "we must prove, in order to defend our trading positions on external 
markets, that we are maxing an effort towards reducing surpluses". He 
also pointed out that, if the US is restructuring its Farm policies, the 
EC should revise its Lax attitude in order to maintain credibility. 
This coinctdes with the EP position, expressed in the 
Catherwood report <2> on CAP and EC external relations, that the US 
and the Community should reach an agreement on Limitations of costly 
export subventions. It also asked the Commission to report on the 
(1) United Sates Mission to the EC - USA Text 25 February 1985. 
(2) Resolution 7 July 1983; OJ n. C 242 of 12 September 1983. 
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advantages that measures like the American "set-aside" and the 
"payment-in-kind" programmes could have over price guarantee programmes. 
The exclusion of trade in agricultural products from a tight GATT 
discipline has produced as a consequence a high degree of protection in this 
sector and an extraordinary high level of·subsiaization which, as between 
the US and the EC, have offset themselves to a great extent. 
Both the ~si~~r enabling the US to pursue domestic policies regardless 
of certain GATT dispositions,and the £~e-~~~1~m of variable levies and 
refunds should be discussed in the next MTN of GATT. 
In particular, a review of the subsidies code, putting clear limits 
to export subventions and abandoning reference to principles such as 
"fair share of world markets", could prove itself highly useful. 
In this context, the 19 March 1985 Council declaration that basic 
objectives and mechanism, internal and external, of the CAP should not 
be put in question, does not seeman encouraging start for the new GATT 
negotiations. 
26. er21~£1i2Di3m, as a general rule, does not provide any lasting 
economic advantage to the State resorting to it: it simply amounts to 
redistributing revenue from certain general categories (i.e. consumers) 
to certain specific categories <workers of the protected industries). 
State subventions operate much the same way, by transferring funds from 
tax payers to specific categories of workers. 
If some scope for limited protection might be found in counteracting 
abrupt phenomena like import "surges" or the like, experience shows that . 
gr21~£!i~~-m~2~Yr~~-1~D~-!Q_g~rg~!Y21~-1b~m~~1~~~, and the political debate 
rarely succeeds in making clear to the public the economic costs of such 
measures and the way that revenue distribution will be affected by them. 
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27. ~fL~§_!r~g~ has been affected, overall, by the weakening of the GATT 
system by the proliferation of non-tariff trade barriers, and in 
particular of "orderly marketing agreements" and "volunatry 
restraints". Annex I shows an up-to-date general image of this situation. 
The system of international market-sharing, which has prevailed in 
sectors like steel, has created enormous problems for EC exports to the 
US: any further extention of this approach, to sectors like agricultural 
markets <e.g. cereal markets) would mean not only further economic costs, 
but preparing the ground for renewed international disputes. 
!~~-~!r~D9!~~oiog_Qf_!~~-§~!!_~~~!~~, based on multilateral free 
trade, on the basis of MFN clause, appears as the only effective way to 
solve the US/EC trade disputes; the next negotiation round should 
comprise therefore, in particular, the following points: 
1) tightening and clarification of the subsidies code (both for domestic 
and export subsidies); 
2) tightening of GATT discipline for agricultural sector: rediscussion 
of the US waiver and the external consequences of the CAP; 
3) improvements to the dispute settlements procedures in GATT: possibility 
of banning unilateral imposition of antidumping countervailing duties. 
28. The US and the EC have suffered badly from changes in international 
patterns of productivity and trade: newly industrialized nations have 
considerably improved their performances in the last years, and whole 
sectors of traditional industries have undergone a deep crisis both in 
the US and in the EC. 
Protectionism, in these conditions, appears simply as a rear-guard battle, 
delaying, at enormous costs for both partners, needed structural changes. 
Note: 
This working paper deals only with trade problems in US/EC relations. The 
financial consequences of protectionism <capital movements, exchange and 
interest rates, EMS/ECU issues) will be dealt with in a subsequent working 
paper. 
- 19 - PE 97.837 
N 
0 
BPS 
EC 
LDC 
OMA 
QR 
"'0 
m 
...0 
--.J 
. 
00 
V' 
'::::!. 
l> 
::l 
::l 
1-4 
TJI_E__S_p_R_E_t\_o __ Oj__N_O_N __ T_l\_RJJJ_~_A_R_R_I_E_R_s_J_A_C_I_t!_G __ M_l\j_Q_R._JM_Q_R_T __ c_~-E~_ojU_E_S_,_j_9§_8:J_9~]-
l"ffOOUCT 
AUTOMO ... U 
us 
, ............. 0... 
ITWIL 
rus.r- -w .. -- 1811 l/JI/1··· 1 • oa M ,.~.~-~tight v.ar.a 
IC llCtJ \If A -· 2/190! -::J 
Goo c Goo •I Vfll, ..lopoftl/1811 - CI/IIU I 
., ___ GI=-"' ~ '!t ~0- ,_ 
,,_ 
.... l VIII.- 18M' 2200-• ==============================-~ :1 
-~ Ult CUitl I - -·-- 1171· 1178,--·· ....,._. 1171- Set .. 1877-. 11!1. --_ ... 
--- . --· c-... ~t ... "_.....,, •• 1:2) ........ _--.,...,..,~ 1112, v...,...._ • .,.._... 1 
.- r~...,...----..-·?1-------- - - - --
us 
lC 
I """_' __ rc_ 1N8·7•_ 1---_1_ .... 1 .......,~....._,to Ill~~ w ~~ ""'=--='-----'· 
--------------------------------
NSI\1 -=~·:..;..10/11 I 
~ E20;:~lrJ 
I 
~~~==~~==~~==~=---------~ 
TIXTUI 
l/lUI•' 
.... 
•IM 
10/111 
"" 
us ~-~C1M21-- r....-·-~··74:1i7al ______ -~-..... -....__. ............ , .. z--.:AGo.otc_........,.. ... _ ..... ,..... I 7111 
lC ~"-~-~~~1 .. 21•-- n-.,_,..........,1., •. ,87.1 ~~-- ..... --..... 2._,._._,__ ... _ ..... ,..... 1 " .. 
~~ ,,_.,_,1 .. 21·-- u-'-""'-"" .... n, ---.. - .... 12"-..._._,__ ..... _., .. ,..,. 1 "" 
-
fOOT-AR 
us 
Ult 
......... 
....., 
Ult 
_,- ---··-
,...,.,..{ """" ..... - ................. L.Ote .......... ,..,.. I 
cus1J OMA,T-.Il .... __ ....._--.-.. -77-a/ati-:J 
"" 
uul OIIM''-· •- ----11/71 .. 1 f 
Ifill I YIIA,T _____ 1_1111'D 
"''co.;;..-...;;.;..;o,.. ........_ 1117.:::-• 1 
IUitl Qi;vvt11·- ttor•-- 11178/IHO .. 1 ~ 
~ ~~~~-;; .. --:-oM.no-___ ,_,w.Wo..o;.o...;,;.~---,-..._.,,.7,-_,.aa,_ I •••• 
COIIIIUIIIIII lliCT11_. l'ltOOUCTI 
us 
lC 
··--
-~ 
"'' r ~~..-- .w.e:YV:c;;.;;:;.;;;....-• .....,_ 
lUll coW. r;.;..;o:-....... , ...... tv ~..--:=J IKir--v:.=TY- 1 2/11 
IFill(~---........,-"" ........ ,_, ~ 
...:..J 
1U1t1 [_Yfii,T-. "--·TV,-. ...... - ~ 
I 1 I 1 I I I I I I 
1101 1111 1iJO 1171 1172 1171 1174 11176 11171 MOTOIICYCUI 
Ul IUSI! '--·- I 4/M Basic Price System T+Q - Tariffs and Quotas -----, 
• • IKII YfA,... _..J 2/M European Commun1ty VTR- V1deo Tape Recorder tc -~ 
Less Developed Country VER - Voluntary Export Restraint ....... ""•I :;:::::::;:::;·~.::::_1 
Orderly Marketing Agreement VRA - Voluntary Restraint Agreement - "''lo..or·-·---·- ~ 
Quantitative Restriction 1177 1n8 111111 1880 1811 11112 111:1 ua4 
Source: OECD 
ll> 
IZ 
IZ 
lrtl 
IX 
I 
11-4 

